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Abstract This paper investigates the empirical validity of the setup of a large-scale
government neighbourhood investment programme in the Netherlands. Selection of
neighbourhoods into the programme was determined by a measure of neighbourhood
quality. At first sight this is a textbook example for the application of a regression
discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of the programme on neighbour-
hood outcomes. Neighbourhoods close to the threshold should be similar before the
programme starts. However, at the discontinuity threshold we observe a surprisingly
large gap in the share of non-Western immigrants between neighbourhoods that were
selected into the programme and neighbourhoods that were not. In addition, there
is non-compliance with the assignment rule based on the quality index. The pattern
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of non-compliance is consistent with investing in neighbourhoods with a high share
of non-Western immigrants. Finally, the way in which neighbourhoods were defined
could be a likely explanation for the imbalance in the share of non-Western immigrants
at the discontinuity threshold.
Keywords Regression discontinuity designs · Government decision-making
processes · Neighbourhood investment programmes
JEL Classification C90 · D70 · R58
1 Introduction
Neighbourhood investment programmes target government transfers toward particu-
lar geographic areas rather than individuals (e.g., Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008). These
investment programmes have been evaluated using several different econometric tech-
niques. A series of recent studies in this area have used regression discontinuity
(RD) designs to estimate treatment effects. For example, Busso et al. (2013) evalu-
ate the employment effects of the U.S. federal urban Empowerment Zone programme;
Freedman (2015) studies the labour-market effects of the NewMarkets Tax Credit pro-
gramme in the United States; and Horn (2015) investigates the relationship between
school quality and capital investments in the housing stock using a boundary discon-
tinuity identification strategy.
RD designs are increasingly used by economists to estimate treatment effects in
a nonexperimental situation where treatment is determined by whether an observed
forcing variable exceeds a cut-off value.1 One of the main reasons for this increased
popularity is that variation around the cut-off value, which determines assignment to
the treatment, can be considered as good as random because those who take part in
the programme have no control over the assignment (e.g., Lee 2008). This inability
to control or influence the assignment to the treatment suggests that the identifying
assumptions required for a valid design are relatively weak (e.g., Hahn et al. 2001). It
is very important to check whether the identifying assumption is valid because (public
or private) knowledge about the assignment rule might influence the assignment to the
treatment. Influencing the assignment to the treatment invalidates the key assumption
that individuals on either side of the discontinuity threshold are similar. Recent studies
have considered the possibility of such “endogenous sorting” around the discontinuity
threshold andhave developed tools to examine its presence and consequences (e.g., Lee
2008;McCrary2008). In addition, a number of studies offer examples of sorting around
the discontinuity threshold. It seems to be the case that sorting is driven by incentives
for potential receivers of the treatment to select themselves into the treatment, such as
home owners, parents/schools, tax payers or traders on financial markets (e.g., Bayer
et al. 2007; Urquiola and Verhoogen 2009; Saez 2010; Bubb and Kaufman 2014; Vogl
2014).
1 See Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Angrist and Pischke (2009, 2010) and Lee and Lemieux (2010) for
recent reviews of the application of RD designs in the economic literature and related scientific areas.
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This research adds a novel case to this relatively new literature about the application
of RD designs when there are opportunities for influencing the discontinuity thresh-
old. We carefully describe a case of sorting disadvantaged areas into a large scale
neighbourhood investment programme. In this case sorting did not result from sub-
jects being able to game the threshold or to select into and out of the treatment group.
Rather the designers of the programme selected units in such a way that the design
becomes invalid. To be specific, policymakers at the national level, who designed and
implemented the assignment rules for the investment programme in disadvantaged
neighbourhoods, sorted areas into and out of the programme in such a way that there
exists a large discontinuity in the share of non-Western immigrants at the discontinuity
threshold. In Sect. 2 we reconstruct how the selection took place that eventually led
to the discontinuity.
The neighbourhood investment programme was implemented in 2008 and con-
sisted of large scale neighbourhood investments in social and physical infrastructure
aimed at improving the living conditions in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the
Netherlands. Approximately 4000 postal code areas (PCAs)2 were ranked based on
a neighbourhood ‘quality’ index (e.g., Tables 1, 2, which we discuss in more detail
below). This index was constructed by making use of eighteen different items (see
Table 9 in the “Appendix”). PCAs with the worst outcomes on the ‘quality’ index
were merged into 40 neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods were selected into the
programme and received additional funds. In the end, 83 PCAs received funding from
the programme. Together these 83 PCAs are put together to form 40 neighbourhoods.
In the period 2008–2011 the Dutch government invested 216 million Euros in these
40 neighbourhoods, while an additional amount of one billion Euros was invested by
housing corporations.
The assignment of PCAs to the programme based on the ‘quality’ index score
is a textbook example for the application of a RD design for estimating the causal
effect of the programme. The reason why this—at first sight—is a good opportunity
for applying a RD design is that PCAs, which are statistical units without any direct
institutional status, should have no influence on being treated and on being selected
into a neighbourhood of adjacent PCAs. However, despite this expectation we observe
at the threshold a surprisingly large and statistically significant gap in the proportion
of non-Western immigrants. This gap is between 11 and 21% points depending on
the specification we use. Next to this unexpected discontinuity at the threshold, there
appears to be non-compliance with the assignment rule because twelve eligible PCAs
have been excluded from the programme by the decision makers, whereas two others
have been added to the treatment group. The observed pattern of non-compliance with
the assignment rule shows a similar difference in the share of non-Western immigrants.
These differences cannot be explained by sorting induced by local authorities at the
municipality level, as they had no control over the assignment to the treatment, nor
had these local authorities the ability to influence the score of individual PCAs on
the ‘quality’ index, and they have also not been able to influence the composition
of neighbourhoods based on adjacent PCAs. Finally, it seems unlikely that a random
2 The postal code area is at the four digit level. For instance 1061 in Amsterdam.
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threshold produces such large differences in the proportion of non-Western immigrants
at the discontinuity threshold.
The violation of a continuous distribution around the discontinuity threshold of
such an important baseline characteristic could be due to the way the selection process
of neighbourhoods has been carried out. Politicians at the national level demanded
that there had to be a list of 40 eligible neighbourhoods. To determine the 40 neigh-
bourhoods, a two-step procedure has been used. In the first step, a preliminary list of
40 neighbourhoods was created based on the most disadvantaged PCAs according to
the PCA ‘quality’ index. Because neighbourhoods can consist of multiple adjacent
PCAs, policymakers at the national level sometimes merged PCAs with different rank
numbers to create a neighbourhood. This opens possibilities of adding lower-ranked
PCAs to an already identified neighbourhood based on a PCA ranked higher. When
we move down the list of PCAs, it is possible to add more PCAs beyond the point at
which 40 geographical PCAs have been identified as neighbourhoods. This process
continues until a PCA from a different geographical area is next on the list and would
become neighbourhood number 41.We show that the PCA that defines neighbourhood
41 is indeed in another city and that the last PCA that has been added is part of one
of the previously defined neighbourhoods. We illustrate the selection of PCAs into
neighbourhoods. Figures 1 and 2 and explain the selection process in more detail in
Sect. 2. In the second step, a number of PCAs were removed from and added to this
Fig. 1 Control (blue), treatment (red) and non-compliance (green) at the PCA level. (Color figure online)
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Fig. 2 Example of constructing neighbourhoods. Schilderswijk, The Hague, neighbourhood boundary
according to Statistics Netherlands (in bold) versus boundaries of PCAs selected into the neighbourhood
programme
list to obtain a final list of 40 eligible neighbourhoods. The added neighbourhoods are
not close to the discontinuity threshold, as we will describe below.
We illustrate the bias of the RD estimates when using the official cut-off. We find
that the estimates from RD models that do not take account of sorting differ from the
estimates from RD models that do account for sorting. We also show that a different
selection process of 40 neighbourhoods does not lead to a discontinuity in the share
of non-Western immigrants. Finally, we cannot rule out that the result of selecting
40 neighbourhoods in this way is a case of bad luck. Using the same procedure to
select 30 neighbourhoods does not yield the same discontinuities. Nevertheless, this
set of estimates and our investigation of the selection process provides a new case
of sorting around a discontinuity threshold in a situation where the units that might
receive treatment have no control over their assignment to treatment. We view our
findings as another cautionary note regarding the use of RD designs. This conclusion
does not only apply to the area of urban economics but applies in general to situations
in which policymakers have control over the assignment to the treatment.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a description
of how the neighbourhood programme was developed and implemented. Sections 3
and 4 document the most salient details of the data and our empirical strategy. Sec-
tion 5 presents the estimation results. In Sect. 6 we show what happens when we use
the invalid design to evaluate the outcomes of the investment programme. Section 7
concludes.
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2 Background of the Neighbourhood Investment Programme
In 2008 the Dutch government introduced a programme to improve the quality of life
in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Until 2011 the national government invested 216
million Euros in these neighbourhoods, while housing corporations added about one
billion Euros to the programme. The programme was targeted towards investing these
resources in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the country. The programme
was an important part of the newly appointed government and was instigated by
the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid). When the programme was announced in
2007, it received a great deal of media attention as it was one of main spearheads of
the newly established political coalition. A new ministry was established to among
othersmanage andmonitor this programme (theMinistry ofHousing,Neighbourhoods
and Integration). Statistics Netherlands was asked to deliver a range of statistics on
the outcomes of treated neighbourhoods in an annual outcome monitor. In addition,
government research organisations were asked to evaluate the effects of the policy and
the Court of Audit monitored whether the funds were appropriately invested in the
targeted areas.
2.1 Defining and Ranking Neighbourhoods
The neighbourhoodswere created fromPCAs that were ranked according to a ‘quality’
index. For each of the selected neighbourhoods a tailor-made investment plan was
developed. Some neighbourhoods invested in physical infrastructure, others spent
more on reducing social problems. The Dutch government’s Court of Audit made an
elaborate overview and has assessed the expenditures (e.g., Court of Audit 2008).
The PCA ‘quality’ indexwas constructed bymaking use of eighteen different items.
These items cover socioeconomic disadvantages, physical disadvantages, and a range
of social problems, such as nuisance, vandalism or insecurity, but also social problems
in terms of poor housing, environmental pollution, heavy traffic, noise pollution and a
lack of safety. The items were both based on measured socioeconomic variables and
information about the housing quality and obtained through surveys about nuisance
and feelings of insecurity among residents (see Table 9 in the “Appendix”). The scores
on this index were collected at the four-digit PCA level. The ranking of PCAs was
used to construct and thereafter select the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods. There
are approximately 4000 PCAs in the Netherlands.
The area of a single PCA is not always considered to define a neighbourhood. In
many cases multiple, geographically adjacent PCAs form neighbourhoods. Together
the selected PCAs formed 40 constructed neighbourhoods that consist of 83 PCAs.
This number of 40 was—according to the responsible politicians at the Ministry of
Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration—a sound number of neighbourhoods to
be able to guarantee a sufficiently large monetary investment, to carefully monitor
progress and to pay regular visits.
Table 1 shows the list of the 40 disadvantaged neighbourhoods and the 83 PCAs
they consist of. Figure 1 shows a map of the Netherlands in which the 83 treated
PCAs are highlighted in red. In most cases, disadvantaged neighbourhoods (PCAs)
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Table 1 40 Neighbourhoods consisting of 83 PCAs (in alphabetical order)
Neighbourhoods Postal code area (PCA), four digit Number of PCAs
Alkmaar Overdie 1813 1
Amersfoort De Kruiskamp 3814 1
Amsterdam Noord 1024,1031,1032 3
Amsterdam Oost 1092,1094 2
Amsterdam Bijlmer 1103,1104 2
Amsterdam Bos en Lommer 1055,1056,1057 3
Amsterdam Nieuw-West 1061,1062,1063,1064,1065,1067,1068,1069 8
Arnhem Spijkerkwartier/ Broek 6828 1
Arnhem Klarendal 6822 1
Arnhem Malburgen/Immerloo 6832,6833,6841 3
Arnhem Presikhaaf-W 6826 1
Den Haag Zuid-West 2532, 2533, 2541, 2542, 2544, 2545 6
Den Haag Schilderswijk 2525, 2526 2
Den Haag Stationsbuurt 2515 1
Den Haag Transvaal 2572 1
Deventer Rivierenwijjk 7417 1
Dordrecht Wielwijk/Crabbehof 3317 1
Eindhoven Bennekel 5654 1
Eindhoven Doornakkers 5642 1
Eindhoven Woensel West 5621 1
Enschede Velve-Lindenhof 7533 1
Groningen De Hoogte 9716 1
Groningen Korrewegwijk 9715 1
Heerlen Meezenbroek 6415 1
Leeuwarden Heechterp/Schieringen 8924 1
Maastricht Noordoost 6222, 6224 2
Nijmegen Hatert 6535 1
Rotterdam Bergpolder 3038 1
Rotterdam Oud-Zuid 3072, 3073, 3074, 3081, 3082, 3083 6
Rotterdam Overschie/Kleinpolder 3042 1
Rotterdam Noord 3031, 3033, 3034, 3035, 3036 5
Rotterdam West 3014, 3021, 3022, 3024, 3025, 3026, 3027 7
Rotterdam Vreewijk 3075 1
Rotterdam Zuidelijke Tuinsteden 3085, 3086 2
Schiedam Nieuwland 3118, 3119 2
Utrecht Kanaleneiland 3526, 3527 2
Utrecht Ondiep/Loevenhoutsedijk 3552 1
Utrecht Overvecht 3561, 3562, 3563, 3564 4
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Table 1 continued
Neighbourhoods Postal code area (PCA), four digit Number of PCAs
Utrecht De Rijkstraat/Schaakbrt 3554 1
Zaanstad Poelenburg 1504 1
Total 83
are located in the largest cities of the country. The vast majority of the neighbourhoods
is concentrated in the four largest cities in the Randstad (i.e., Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
The Hague and Utrecht). The PCAs in blue and green are control and non-compliance
areas, respectively. We explain them below in more detail.
2.2 The Process of Selecting Neighbourhoods
The consequence of the political decision at the national level to merge 83 PCAs to
arrive at a number of 40 neighbourhoods is that PCAs with consecutive rank numbers
(on the ‘quality’ index) are not necessarily geographically adjacent to each other. In
most cases a neighbourhood consists of multiple PCAs with different rank numbers.
Moreover, the geographical boundaries of (a collection of) PCAs yields neighbour-
hoods that do often not correspond to the official classification of neighbourhoods
as defined by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Figure 2 shows an example. It displays
the neighbourhood Schilderswijk in the Hague, which, according to Table 1, con-
sists of PCAs 2525 and 2526. The fat solid line depicts the geographical boundary
of the neighbourhood according to the official classification of CBS. The thin solid
lines depicts the boundaries of the PCAs. As can be seen, the areas do not coincide.
Moreover, the neighbourhood not only consists of PCAs 2525 and 2526, but also of
a number of other PCAs. Also, parts of the PCAs 2525 and 2526 do not lie in the
Schilderswijk.
The process to construct 40 neighbourhoods involved two steps. First, 40 neighbour-
hoods were constructed bymoving down the list of PCAs. Since these neighbourhoods
do not necessarily coincide with the official classifications of Statistics Netherlands
but consist of adjacent PCAs, it is difficult to precisely reconstruct the exact scope of
these initial 40 neighbourhoods. In the second step, policymakers removed and added
PCAs to the list to arrive at a final list of 40 neighbourhoods.
Table 2 shows the results of both steps. The table documents the worst 187 PCAs
in the Netherlands according to the ‘quality’ index (we discuss the most salient details
of the index in Sect. 3). The first two columns display the rank number and PCA (the
higher the rank, the worse the score on the ‘quality’ index). The third column shows
the number of the neighbourhood the PCA has been assigned to. The fourth column
displays the neighbourhood’s name. The printing of the neighbourhood ranks defines
whether or not a neigbourhood is part of the treatment group. Neighbourhood ranks
displayed in italics only are part of the treatment group, neighbourhood ranks in italics
and bold have been removed from the treatment by policymakers and neighbourhood
ranks in bold only are part of the control group.We link these PCAs to a neighbourhood
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Table 2 Ranking of postal code areas (PCAs) and the neighbourhoods they belong to
Rank  PCA and Municipality Neighbourhood Name of the Neighbourhood 
1 1061 Amsterdam 1 Amsterdam Nieuw-West
2 3086 Rotterdam 2 Rotterdam Zuidelijke Tuinsteden
3 3035 Rotterdam 3 Rotterdam Noord
4 3073 Rotterdam 4 Rotterdam Oud-Zuid
5 3552 Utrecht 5 Utrecht Ondiep/Loevenhoutsedijk
6 7417 Deventer 6 Deventer Rivierenwijjk
7 3027 Rotterdam 7 Rotterdam West
8 3014 Rotterdam 7 Rotterdam West
9 8924 Leeuwarden 8 Leeuwarden Heechterp/Schieringen
10 6222 Maastricht 9 Maastricht Noordoost
11 3026 Rotterdam 7 Rotterdam West
12 1072 Amsterdam A1 Amsterdam De Pijp 
13 6535 Nijmegen 10 Nijmegen Hatert
14 3074 Rotterdam 4 Rotterdam Oud-Zuid
15 5621 Eindhoven 11 Eindhoven Woensel West
16 1065 Amsterdam 1 Amsterdam Nieuw-West
17 3527 Utrecht 12 Utrecht Kanaleneiland
18 2525 's-Gravenhage 13 Den Haag Schilderswijk
19 1504 Zaanstad 14 Zaanstad Poelenburg
20 3081 Rotterdam 4 Rotterdam Oud-Zuid
21 2541 's-Gravenhage 15 Den Haag Zuid-West
22 1031 Amsterdam 16 Amsterdam Noord
23 1057 Amsterdam 17 Amsterdam Bos en Lommer
24 3814 Amersfoort 18 Amersfoort De Kruiskamp
25 6833 Arnhem 19 Arnhem Malburgen/Immerloo
26 3036 Rotterdam 3 Rotterdam Noord
27 3025 Rotterdam 7 Rotterdam West
28 3021 Rotterdam 7 Rotterdam West
29 6841 Arnhem 19 Arnhem Malburgen/Immerloo
30 3031 Rotterdam 3 Rotterdam Noord
31 3085 Rotterdam 2 Rotterdam Zuidelijke Tuinsteden
32 1055 Amsterdam 17 Amsterdam Bos en Lommer
33 6826 Arnhem 20 Arnhem Presikhaaf-W
34 1012 Amsterdam A2 Amsterdam Burgwallen-Oude Zijde 
35 3072 Rotterdam 4 Rotterdam Oud-Zuid
36 9716 Groningen 21 Groningen De Hoogte
37 1094 Amsterdam 22 Amsterdam Oost
38 3034 Rotterdam 3 Rotterdam Noord
39 1032 Amsterdam 16 Amsterdam Noord
40 2533 's-Gravenhage 15 Den Haag Zuid-West
41 6832 Arnhem 19 Arnhem Malburgen/Immerloo
42 6224 Maastricht 9 Maastricht Noordoost
43 3563 Utrecht 23 Utrecht Overvecht
44 1063 Amsterdam 1 Amsterdam Nieuw-West
45 9711 Groningen A3 Groningen Centrum 
46 3075 Rotterdam 24 Rotterdam Vreewijk
47 2572 's-Gravenhage 25 Den Haag Transvaal
48 1069 Amsterdam 1 Amsterdam Nieuw-West
49 3561 Utrecht 23 Utrecht Overvecht
50 2544 's-Gravenhage 15 Den Haag Zuid-West
51 3082 Rotterdam 4 Rotterdam Oud-Zuid
52 3033 Rotterdam 3 Rotterdam Noord
53 3526 Utrecht 12 Utrecht Kanaleneiland
54 1104 Amsterdam 26 Amsterdam Bijlmer
55 5642 Eindhoven 27 Eindhoven Doornakkers
56 9712 Groningen A3 Groningen Centrum 
57 1064 Amsterdam 1 Amsterdam Nieuw-West
58 3024 Rotterdam 7 Rotterdam West
59 3118 Schiedam 28 Schiedam Nieuwland
60 1053 Amsterdam A4 Amsterdam Oud-West/Kinkerbuurt 
61 1813 Alkmaar 29 Alkmaar Overdie
62 3083 Rotterdam 4 Rotterdam Oud-Zuid
63 6415 Heerlen 30 Heerlen Meezenbroek
64 1073 Amsterdam A1 Amsterdam De Pijp 
65 1093 Amsterdam 22 Amsterdam Oost 
66 1092 Amsterdam 22 Amsterdam Oost
67 2532 's-Gravenhage 15 Den Haag Zuid-West
68 3038 Rotterdam 31 Rotterdam Bergpolder
69 1062 Amsterdam 1 Amsterdam Nieuw-West
70 1074 Amsterdam A1 Amsterdam De Pijp 
71 6828 Arnhem 32 Arnhem Spijkerkwartier/ Broek
72 3022 Rotterdam 7 Rotterdam West
73 3042 Rotterdam 33 Rotterdam Overschie/Kleinpolder
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Table 2 continued
75 1056 Amsterdam 17 Amsterdam Bos en Lommer
76 5654 Eindhoven 35 Eindhoven Bennekel
77 1067 Amsterdam 1 Amsterdam Nieuw-West
78 1103 Amsterdam 26 Amsterdam Bijlmer
79 3564 Utrecht 23 Utrecht Overvecht
80 4827 Breda A5 Breda Geeren-Noord 
Reconstructed cut-off 
81 3119 Schiedam 29 Schiedam Nieuwland
82 2526 's-Gravenhage 13 Den Haag Schilderswijk
83 2515 's-Gravenhage 36 Den Haag Stationsbuurt
84 3554 Utrecht 37 Utrecht De Rijkstraat/Schaakbuurt
85 9715 Groningen 38 Groningen Korrewegwijk
86 2571 's-Gravenhage A6 Den Haag Oostbroek Zuid 
87 2542 's-Gravenhage 15 Den Haag Zuid-West
88 3551 Utrecht A7 Utrecht Tweede Daalsedijk-Schutstraat 
89 6161 Sittard-Geleen A8 Sittard-Geleen Geleen Centrum 
90 3562 Utrecht 23 Utrecht Overvecht
91 2545 's-Gravenhage 15 Den Haag Zuid-West
92 1068 Amsterdam 1 Amsterdam Nieuw-West
93 3317 Dordrecht 39 Dordrecht Wielwijk/Crabbehof
Official cut-off used by policymakers 
94 1443 Purmerend 
95 5025 Tilburg 
96 6823 Arnhem 
97 9713 Groningen 
98 9743 Groningen 
99 6217 Maastricht 
100 3192 Rotterdam 
101 1784 Den Helder 
74 6822 Arnhem 34 Arnhem Klarendal
Rank  PCA and Municipality Name of the Neighbourhood 
102 3122 Schiedam 
103 3525 Utrecht 
104 1024 Amsterdam 16 Amsterdam Noord
105 2512 's-Gravenhage 
106 3012 Rotterdam 
107 6511 Nijmegen 
108 2516 's-Gravenhage 
109 4382 Vlissingen 
110 3037 Rotterdam 
111 2531 's-Gravenhage 
112 1051 Amsterdam 
113 3076 Rotterdam 
114 1091 Amsterdam 
115 2263 Leidschendam-Voorburg 
116 3812 Amersfoort 
117 8911 Leeuwarden 
118 3079 Rotterdam 
119 6811 Arnhem 
120 6414 Heerlen 
121 1052 Amsterdam 
122 1097 Amsterdam 
123 3078 Rotterdam 
124 1054 Amsterdam 
125 5643 Eindhoven 
126 3023 Rotterdam 
127 5652 Eindhoven 
128 4816 Breda 
129 1013 Amsterdam 
130 3061 Rotterdam 
131 2315 Leiden 
132 2524 's-Gravenhage 
133 1505 Zaanstad 
Neighbourhood 
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Table 2 continued
134 6538 Nijmegen 
135 7415 Deventer 
136 4142 Leerdam 
137 9933 Delfzijl 
138 2543 's-Gravenhage 
139 4201 Gorinchem 
140 1058 Amsterdam 
141 4205 Gorinchem 
142 5701 Helmond 
143 1095 Amsterdam 
144 2511 's-Gravenhage 
145 3015 Rotterdam 
146 8031 Zwolle 
147 1034 Amsterdam 
148 6882 Rheden 
149 3313 Dordrecht 
150 2321 Leiden 
151 3032 Rotterdam 
152 3555 Utrecht 
153 6214 Maastricht 
154 1102 Amsterdam 
155 3053 Rotterdam 
Rank  PCA and Municipality Name of the Neighbourhood 
156 1972 Velsen 
157 4812 Breda 
158 3512 Utrecht 
159 4006 Tiel 
160 2624 Delft 
161 2802 Gouda 
162 1502 Zaanstad 
163 7323 Apeldoorn 
164 3052 Rotterdam 
165 3112 Schiedam 
166 8937 Leeuwarden 
167 3582 Utrecht 
168 3765 Soest 
169 5223 's-Hertogenbosch 
170 5612 Eindhoven 
171 1503 Zaanstad 
172 1016 Amsterdam 
173 2316 Leiden 
174 8918 Leeuwarden 
175 3132 Vlaardingen 
176 1033 Amsterdam 
177 9741 Groningen 
178 7416 Deventer 
179 2628 Delft 
180 1783 Den Helder 
181 3193 Rotterdam 
182 3136 Vlaardingen 
183 6542 Nijmegen 
184 5042 Tilburg 
185 3531 Utrecht 
186 6416 Heerlen 
187 3071 Rotterdam 
Note: PCA 7533 Enschede Velve-Lindenhof (Neighbourhood number 40) is not on this list as it pertains to rank number 210. The 
neighbourhood ranks displayed in italics only have been selected by policymakers and are part of the treatment group. The neighbourhood 
ranks displayed in bold and italics have been dismissed by policymakers. The numbers in bold only are part of the control group. 
Neighbourhood 
just as the policymakers linked the non-removed PCAs to neighbourhoods. That is,
we reconstruct the preliminary list from the first step. If we move down Table 2, at
least four observations stand out.
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First, and consistent with Fig. 1, a number of PCAs have been put together to
form one neighbourhood. For instance 3086 (rank 2) and 3085 (rank 31) in Rotter-
dam form one neighbourhood (Zuidelijke Tuinsteden). This selection rule to define
neighbourhoods leads to putting together PCAs into neighbourhoods until the 41st
neighbourhood needs to be defined.
Second, the official cut-off is set at rank 93. Policymakers at the national level
arrived at this point after removing 12 and adding 2 PCAs to the list in the second
step of the selection process. The 12 removed PCAs are bold italic in Table 2. These
areas are mostly touristic centres in which there is nuisance in terms of traffic and
environmental pollution. We linked these PCAs to a neighbourhood. PCAs 7533 and
1024 have been added to the list.3 As can be seen, the cut-off lies at the point where
39 neighbourhoods have been identified. Including 7533 (Enschede Velve-Lindenhof)
yields the 40th neighbourhood (this PCA is ranked 210th according to the ‘quality’
index). PCA 1024 belongs to Amsterdam Noord, which was already defined. This
shows the tendency of policymakers at the national level of adding PCAs to already
existing neighbourhoods until a 41st neighbourhood would be created.
Third, if the selection rule to define neighbourhoods was such that each single PCA
would have been considered a neighbourhood, the point at which we can identify 40
‘neighbourhoods’, would have been at rank 40 (just after 2533 Den Haag Zuid-West).
Fourth, if we allow for the combination of adjacent PCAs into a single neighbour-
hood, and do not remove the twelve PCAs as the policymakers did in the second step,
we arrive for the first time at 40 neighbourhoods at rank 80 (just after including 4827
Breda Geeren-Noord). Both ‘reconstructed’ cut-offs are different from the official
cut-off. We analyse the consequences of using different selection rules in Sect. 5.
Finally, Fig. 3 shows the relationship between the (scaled) ‘quality’ index of PCAs
and the actual participation in the programme using the official cut-off (at row num-
ber 93). PCAs with scores above 0 are eligible to participate in the neighbourhood
investment programme, while PCAs with scores below 0 are not (as shown on the hor-
izontal axis of Fig. 3). Compliance and non-compliance with this assignment rule can
be observed from the vertical axis of Fig. 3. The 12 PCAs with a score on the ‘quality’
index that would justify treatment, but have not been selected into the treatment, are
shown at the bottom of the horizontal axis with scores above 0. PCA 1024 Amsterdam
with a negative score on the ‘quality’ index that would not justify treatment lies to
the left of cut-off at the top of the horizontal axis. PCA 7533 has also been added to
the treatment, but is not displayed in this figure because it has a very low score on the
assignment variable (−2.3) and ranks 210th. It lies far to the left of the cut-off.
3 Data
The data for our empirical analysis are obtained fromvarious sources. First, the ranking
of PCAs and the score on the ‘quality’ index were obtained from ABF Research, the
organisation that was asked by the government to construct the index. The ‘quality’
indexwill be used as the forcing variable for the assignment of PCAs to the programme
3 7533 Enschede Velve-Lindenhof is not visible in Table 2 because this PCA has rank number 210.
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Fig. 3 Assignment of PCAs to treatment by ‘quality’ index score
in the RD model. We rescaled this variable in such a way that neighbourhoods with
scores above 0 are eligible, while neighbourhoods with scores below 0 are not.
Second, we obtained information on seven outcome measures from the Ministry
of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment: an index for the quality of life;
the quality of the public space; social cohesion; safety; quality of public services;
quality of the composition of the population and quality of the housing stock. The first
measure varies between 1 and 7, and is based on the other six measures. These vary
between −50 and 50, with 0 corresponding to the national average. The numbers do
not have a clear interpretation, except that lower numbers refer to lower quality. We
obtained these measures for 2006, one year before the start of the programme, and for
2012, four years after the start of the programme.
Third,weobtained information fromStatisticsNetherlands on the size and composi-
tion of the populationwithin PCAs: population size and the percentages of immigrants,
Western-immigrants and non-Western immigrants. Fourth, we obtained national elec-
tion outcomes at the ballot box level for 2010 and 2012.4
Table 3 compares the means of the outcomes and covariates for all 93 eligible PCAs
to the right of the cut-off and the same number of ineligible PCAs to the left of the
cut-off.5 We observe that in 2006, a year before the start of the programme the eligible
PCAs on average do worse on nearly all outcome measures. Moreover, these PCAs
have much higher proportions of (non-Western) immigrants. In 2012, four years after
the start of the programme, we observe a similar pattern for the differences on the
outcomes variables.
4 Data from Joost Smits. For 2010: http://www.prize.nl/wiki/doku.php?id=software:databasetk2010. For
2012: http://www.prize.nl/wiki/doku.php?id=software:databasetk2012. Multiple ballot boxes can reside in
one PCA.
5 We use 94 instead of 93 neighbourhoods to the left of the cut-off because two neighbourhoods have the
same value of the forcing variable.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of estimation sample
Variable Pre treatment (2006) Post treatment (2012)
Ineligible
PCAs
Eligible
PCAs
Ineligible
PCAs
Eligible
PCAs
Quality of life score 3.84 3.04 4.28 3.66
Social cohesion −8.82 −13.18 −5.88 −11.14
Quality of public space 0.87 −3.05 9.49 7.57
Safety −34.51 −43.35 −28.35 −39.5
Quality of public services 16.20 21.87 15.13 20.23
Quality of housing stock −36.76 −40.62 −32.73 −35.33
Quality of population
composition
−31.14 −42.64 −19.91 −35.51
Percentage immigrants 38.49 55.39 − −
Percentage Western
immigrants
11.10 10.14 − −
Percentage non-Western
immigrants
27.39 45.25 − −
Percentage voted for
Labour Party*
− − 33.42 39.46
N (=number of PCAs) 94 93 94 93
* Observational unit is the ballot box, n = 482 (ballot boxes) in the 94 PCAs left to the cut-off, and n = 457
in the 93 PCAs right to the cut-off. In our analysis, we also use the outcome year 2010 for this variable. The
figures are then as follows: left to the cut-off, 27.91% (n = 482), right to the cut-off 35.05% (n = 471)
4 Empirical Strategy
The selection of PCAs based on the ‘quality’ index is at first sight an opportunity for
applying a RD design to evaluate the effects of the programme. The cut-off for assign-
ment to the treatment generates variation that is expected to be exogenous because it
is beyond the control of the treatment and control PCAs. As the central government
decided about the construction of the ‘quality’ index and because this index was not
announced or available on beforehand, it can be expected that PCAs at both sides of
the cut-off will be very similar. A comparison of the outcomes of PCAs close to the
cut-off will then yield the causal effect of the neighbourhood programme. The basic
assumption in this model is that the potential outcomes and characteristics of the PCAs
are smooth around the cut-off.
This basic assumption can be investigated by performing balancing tests for the
similarity of covariates or outcome variables before the start of the programme across
the cut-off. These tests can be carried out by using a reduced form model as specified
in Eq. (1):
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Yi = δ0 + δ1Zi + f (I ) + ϑi , (1)
where Yi is an outcome or covariate before the start of the programme of PCA i , Zi is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ‘quality’ index is > 0 and 0 if the ‘quality’ index
is < 0, and ϑi are unobserved factors. f (.) is a smooth function of the ‘quality’ index,
which is allowed to be different at either side of the cut-off ( fl and fr ), as suggested by
Lee and Lemieux (2010), i.e. f (Ii ) = fl(Ii ) + Pi [ fr (Ii ) − fl(Ii )]. The parameter δ1
reveals whether or not the outcomes and covariates before the start of the programme
are balanced across the cut-off. Statistically insignificant estimates of this parameter
can be considered as support for the main assumption of the RD model.
If this main assumption holds, the causal effect of the programme can be estimated
by making use of specifications that are very similar to Eq. (1). In case of full com-
pliance with the assignment rule, which means that all PCAs with a ‘quality’ index
score above (below) the cut-off (don’t) enrol into the programme, the effect of the
programme can be estimated using the following specification:
Yi = α0 + α1Pi + f (I ) + α2Xi + εi , (2)
where Yi is the outcome of PCA i , Pi is a dummy variable for treatment, Xi is a vector
of control variables and εi are unobserved factors. The main parameter for estimation
is α1, which can be interpreted as the causal effect of the treatment on the outcomes.
Identification of α1 is based on the non-linear relationship between the ‘quality’ index
and the allocation of resources around the cut-off.
However, the selection of PCAs into the programme did not fully comply with the
assignment rule. This non-compliance can be dealt with in an instrumental variable
(IV) approach. The causal effect of the programme can be estimated by using the
dummy for the assignment rule (Zi ) as an instrument for participation in the pro-
gramme (Pi ) in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. The first and second stage
equations in this approach are
Pi = β0 + β1Zi + f (I ) + β2Xi + ηi , (3)
and
Yi = γ0 + γ1 Pˆi + f (I ) + γ2Xi + θi , (4)
where Pˆi in Eq. (4) is the predicted probability of Eq. (3). Estimates of the parameter
γ1 yield the causal effect of the treatment for PCAs that comply with the assignment
rule.
5 Sorting Around the Threshold
The empirical strategy outlined in the previous section can be applied to estimate
the causal effect of the neighbourhood investment programme when the potential
outcomes behave smoothly around the cut-off for the assignment of the treatment.
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Fig. 4 Balancing tests for six outcomes
To investigate this assumption we perform balancing tests for seven outcome vari-
ables measured a year before the start of the programme and for three covariates. For
the balancing test, we estimate the reduced formmodel [Eq.(1)]. To estimate the causal
effects of the programme, we apply the 2SLS approach outlined in Eqs. (3) and (4).
In all our estimations we use the most conservative (i.e., largest) standard errors.6
5.1 Balancing Tests
Table 4 and Fig. 4 show the results of the balancing tests for the seven main outcomes
variables that have been used to build the ‘quality’ index. We use a sample of 187
PCAs that includes all 93 PCAs to the right of the discontinuity threshold and 94
PCAs to the left of the cut-off.
Figure 4 illustrates that measures of social cohesion, the quality of the public space,
safety, the quality of public services, the quality of the housing stock and the quality of
the composition of the population in the 187 PCAs behave smoothly around the cut-off
for participating in the programme. As the estimated relationships and the confidence
bounds show, the bivariate relationships are statistically similar for both the treated
PCAs and the non-treated PCAs.
6 In most cases these were obtained by only correcting for heteroskedasticity. We also experimented with
clustered standard errors at the municipality level (n = 39). This yields in most cases smaller standard
errors. The notes below each table with regression coefficients document which standard errors apply.
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Fig. 5 Balancing test for seventh outcome ‘quality of life’
For each outcome in Table 4 we use a specification with a linear and square term of
the forcing variable. We find that all reduced-form estimates are statistically insignif-
icant. Similar results are found when we focus on a discontinuity sample closer to the
cut-off (50 PCAs to the right and 50 PCAs to the left of the cut-off). The results for the
seventh outcome variable ‘quality of life’, which is based on the six outcomes used
in Table 4, are also statistically insignificant (see last column in Table 4). Figure 5
illustrates this as the estimated relationship is not statistically different for the treated
and non-treated PCAs. These findings suggest that the allocation of PCAs around the
threshold is random, which supports the possibility and usefulness of applying a RD
design.
Next to the indicators that should reveal information about the ‘quality’ of the
neighbourhood, the composition of the population seems a natural indicator to inves-
tigate. Many of the PCAs that are selected into the treatment are located in the larger
cities in the Randstad. It is well-known that the population composition in these cities
is different from cities outside this area. This does not have to be a problem if the
comparison in the RD framework is between PCAs with similar characteristics, some-
thing we expect if the variation around the cut-off is as good as random. However,
inspection of indicators of the composition of the population suggest a remarkable
difference between the treatment and control PCAs at the cut-off.
Table 5 shows balancing tests for three indicators of the composition of the pop-
ulation, which have somewhat surprisingly not been included in the ‘quality’ index.
Depending on the specification, we observe that in 2006 there are living between 11
and 21% points more non-Western immigrants in PCAs in the treatment group com-
pared to PCAs in the control group.7 For the smaller discontinuity sample of 100 PCAs
we observe similar differences in the composition of the population.
7 Non-western immigrantsmake up 11%of theDutch population in 2006. The largemajority of non-western
immigrants are from Morocco, Turkey, Surinam and the Antilles.
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Table 5 Balancing tests: the effect of the assignment to treatment on various outcomes before the start of
the programme using a discontinuity sample of 187 PCAs (reduced form estimates)
Independent
variables
Dependent variable
Percentage
immigrants
Percentage Western
immigrants
Percentage non-
Western immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dummy=1 if
index≥0
10.43** 21.65*** −1.110 0.378 11.52** 21.27**
(4.829) (7.891) (1.096) (1.334) (5.095) (8.353)
Quality index (i.e.
forcing variable)
0.447 −24.61 0.594 −5.067* −0.141 −19.56
(3.439) (15.01) (0.746) (2.880) (3.504) (15.59)
Quality
index×dummy=1
if index≥0
3.361 27.07* −0.913 5.973** 4.274 21.11
(3.737) (15.63) (0.804) (2.993) (3.890) (16.36)
Quality index∧2 −1,146* −258.9* −888.4
(681.6) (142.3) (702.5)
Quality index∧2
×dummy=1 if
index≥0
1,176* 231.7 945.9
(686.9) (143.1) (709.0)
Constant 38.98*** 28.68*** 11.76*** 9.428*** 27.23*** 19.25***
(3.874) (6.687) (0.929) (1.107) (3.903) (6.867)
Observations 187 187 187 187 187 187
Each column is an OLS-regression. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
This gap in the proportion of non-Western immigrants implies a large increase
of this proportion at the cut-off, as shown in Fig. 6. The observed difference in the
composition of the population implies that the basic assumption about smoothness
around the discontinuity is unlikely to hold. Figure 6 illustrates this by showing that
the difference between treated and non-treated PCAs is statically significant.
5.2 Non-compliance with the Assignment Rule
We next look at non-compliance of PCAs with the assignment rules. Twelve PCAs
were eligible for participation but were excluded; two PCAs were ineligible but did
receive the treatment. Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for these two groups. The
first row shows that the two PCAs that were ineligible do better on the ‘quality’ index.
It should also be noted that one of these two PCAs ranked as PCA number 210 in the
original ranking. The second row in Table 6 shows however that the ‘quality of the
composition of the population’ differs statistically significant between the PCAs that
did receive funds and the PCAs that were eligible but did not receive funds. Two of
the other population indicators ‘percentage immigrants’ and ‘percentage non-Western
immigrants’ show the same picture. This pattern of non-compliance is similar when
compared to the previous findings from the balancing tests.
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Fig. 6 Discontinuity in the proportion of non-western immigrants
Table 6 Descriptive statistics for PCAs that did not comply with the assignment rule
Variable Ineligible but did
receive funds
Eligible but did not
receive funds
Difference p value
Quality index
(forcing variable)
−1.38 0.97 −2.35 0.009
Quality of composition of
population
−42.5 −21.2 −21.3 0.013
Percentage immigrants 54.3 41.8 12.4 0.290
Percentage Western
immigrants
9.3 15.3 −5.9 0.014
Percentage non-Western
immigrants
44.9 26.6 18.3 0.174
Number of PCAs 2 12
5.3 Balancing Tests with Alternative Neighbourhood Definitions/Cut-Offs
We next look what happens to our balancing tests for non-Western immigrants when
we choose different neighbourhood definitions and different cut-offs. We investigate
what happens with the tests if we use (i) our reconstructed cut-off at the point at which
for the first time we obtain 40 neighbourhoods (rank 80 in Table 2), (ii) the cut-off
at which we for the first time obtain 40 PCAs (rank 40 in Table 2), (iii) the same
strategy as the policymakers have done for a selection of 30 neighbourhoods (rank 63
in Table 2), (iv) the ‘reconstructed’ cut-off for 30 neighbourhoods (rank 55 in Table 2),
and (v) the cut-off at which we for the first time obtain 30 PCAs (rank 30 in Table 2).
Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. We draw two conclusions from the
coefficients documented in this table. First, the coefficients of the balancing test of
selecting 40 neighbourhoods in a differentway showno discontinuity in the percentage
non-Western immigrants. This suggests that removing PCAs that were eligible and
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adding PCAs until the point at which the 41st neighbourhood has to be selected yields a
discontinuity. The reason for this is that the PCAwhich forms the 41st neighbourhood
has to be different from the PCAs that together yield the first 40 neighbourhoods.
If it would have been similar, policymakers would have added the PCA to one of
the existing 40 neighbourhoods. Second, when using the same procedure and our
alternative procedures to select 30 neighbourhoods,we do not find discontinuities. This
also holds for the case in which we keep on adding PCAs to neighbourhoods until we
are force to define neighbourhood 31. This suggests two things. First, we cannot rule
out that the discontinuity is the result of a coincidence. Second, the difference between
the treatment and control PCAs around the cut-off of 30 neighbourhoods seems to be
absent because we are able to compare neighbourhoods from similar cities, mainly in
the Randstad (e.g. around the cut-off at rank 55 or 63 a number of PCAs pertain to the
largest four cities in the Randstad).8 Compared to a cut-off set at 40 neighbourhoods,
not one of the first six PCAs after the cut-off pertains to the Randstad. This seems to
be a major reason for the discontinuity we observe at the cut-off.
6 Illustration of ‘Invalid’ RD
Endogenous sorting around the discontinuity threshold invalidates the application of
a RD design because the assignment of the treatment to PCAs just below or above
the threshold value no longer can be considered to be (conditionally) independent.
We conduct two types of analysis. First, we show the potential bias in outcomes of
the RD model when we use the official cut-off and the discontinuity in the share of
non-Western immigrants is not taken into account. Second, we look what happens
with the RD-estimates when we control for the share of non-Western immigrants.
Table 8 investigates this. The first RDmodel does not take into account proportion of
non-Western immigrants (columns (1), (3) and (5)), the second model controls for this
variable (columns (2), (4) and (6)). We estimate the effect of the programme on three
different outcomes: the quality of life and voting for the Labour Party in the elections
of 2010 and in the elections of 2012. The last two outcomes might be relevant as the
minister who was responsible for the programme is a member of the Labour Party.
The estimated effect of the programme on the quality of life is insignificant in
both specifications. However, the estimated effects are different from each other; the
estimated effect in column (1) is negative, whereas in column (2) it turns positive
when including non-Western immigrants as covariate. In column (3) we observe that
not taking account of the difference in non-Western immigrants at the cut-off would
yield 9% points more votes for the Labour Party in the elections of 2010 which can
be attributed to the programme. However, non-Western immigrants are more likely to
vote for the Labour Party, and we find that the estimated effect reduces towards zero
after taking account of this population difference. In the last two columns we also find
a large difference between the two estimates, varying between an increase of Labour
Party voters in 2012 with 5.4% points and a decrease of 4.3% points.
8 These cities have relatively high shares of non-Western immigrants.
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7 Lessons
This paper documents a case of sorting around the discontinuity threshold for assigning
neighbourhoods to a large-scale investment programme. Selection of neighbourhoods
into the programme was determined by policymakers at the national level based on a
score on a ‘quality’ index. At first sight this seems to be a textbook example for the
application of a RD model aimed at estimating the causal effect of the programme.
The forcing variable was constructed from using eighteen indicators on socioe-
conomic or housing disadvantages, social problems and safety issues. PCAs and
neighbourhoods had no control over the assignment to the treatment. However, at the
cut-off for assignment to the programme, we find a remarkably large difference in the
proportion of non-Western immigrants, a variable not taken into account in the ‘qual-
ity’ index. We also find that the pattern of non-compliance with the assignment rule
seems consistent with investing in neighbourhoods with a high share of non-Western
immigrants. These remarkable differences cannot be explained by sorting induced by
PCAs themselves, as they had no control over the assignment to the treatment. It also
seems highly unlikely that random sorting of neighbourhoods will produce such large
differences in the proportion of non-Western immigrants at the cut-off.
We find that this non-random sorting may generate a bias of the RD estimates.
Despite the differences in the proportion of non-Western immigrants at the disconti-
nuity threshold, both policymakers and researchers have used the cut-off to analyse
the effects of the neighbourhood investment programme. The Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment (currently the Ministry of the Interior), under
which supervision the neighbourhood investment programme was launched, has ini-
tiated several ways to review the progress of the programme. There are several more
descriptive reports available about improvements in outcomes. These reports aim to
informmembers of parliament about the progress of the programme (e.g., CBS 2012).
None of these reports have noticed or taken into account the difference in the propor-
tion of non-Western immigrants at the discontinuity threshold. Also researchers did
not take into account this difference at the threshold. For example,Wittebrood and Per-
mentier (2011) conclude that the share of non-Western immigrants is not increasing in
treatment PCAs that focussed on the restructuring of housing. Such a finding has been
regarded as a positive signal of improvement, but given our observation that the share
of non-Western immigrants was higher in the treatment PCAs before the programme
started, this sheds different light on perceived success. In addition, a recent study by
Permentier et al. (2013) uses the discontinuity threshold in a RD setting to evaluate
the effects of the programme. This study also does not take into account the difference
in the share of non-Western immigrants nor does it account for non-compliance with
the assignment rule.
Based on our empirical analysis we have to be careful in concluding whether or not
policymakers’ preferences or political forces at the national level have contributed to
the sorting patterns observed in the data. The simplest explanation for the observed
sorting pattern is that it is a coincidence that there is such a large discontinuity in the
share of non-Western immigrants at the threshold. Indeed, several indicators have been
constructed to make a decision about which PCAs would be eligible for treatment and
by coincidence there could be a discontinuity in the share of non-Western immigrants
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at exactly this threshold. Our analysis of the alternative of selecting 30 neighbourhoods
with the same criterion does not rule out this possibility.
However, someobservations suggest otherwise. First, the pattern of non-compliance
with the assignment rule is consistent with selecting PCAs with more or less non-
Western immigrants into and out of the treatment, respectively. Second, the size of
the difference at the threshold points at selecting neighbourhoods in the Randstad
relative to neighbourhoods in large cities in other parts of the country. Non-Western
immigrants are concentrated in the Randstad. This selection seems to be the result of
the selection rule to keep on adding PCAs to neighbourhoods until the threshold of 40
neighbourhoods set by the Minister was exhausted.
Overall, our results provide a new case of sorting around a threshold in a situation
where the units that might receive treatment have no control over their assignment
to the treatment. We view our findings as a cautionary note regarding the use of RD
designs in situations in which policymakers are able to influence the assignment to
the treatment.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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Appendix
See Table 9.
Table 9 Eighteen indicators used in the construction of the quality index (=forcing variable)
Indicators
per theme
Description Source Survey year used
Disadvantages
Theme 1: socioeconomic
disadvantages
1 Income Average net household
income
RIO, CBS 2002
2 Work Fraction employed RIO, CBS 2002
3 Education Fraction of low educated
households
Wegener/
Geomarktprofiel
2002
Theme 2: infrastructural/physical disadvantages
4 Small residences Number of small residences
(house with less than 3 or 4
rooms)
CBS/Syswov/CFV 2002, 2006
5 Old residences Number of old houses (built
in 1970 or before)
CBS/Syswov/CFV 2002, 2006
6 Cheap residences Number of social housing CBS/Syswov/CFV 2002, 2006
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Table 9 continued
Indicators
per theme
Description Source Survey year used
Problems
Theme 3: social problems I
7 Vandalism (1) Is there graffiti on walls or
buildings in your
neighbourhood?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
8 Vandalism (2) Have telephone boots or
tram/bus shelters been
destroyed in your
neighbourhood?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
9 Social nuisance (1) Do your direct
neighbourhoods cause
nuisance?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
10 Social nuisance (2) Do residents in your
neighbourhood cause
nuisance?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
11 Feelings of unsafety Are you afraid of being
harassed or robbed in your
neighbourhood?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
Theme 4: social problems II
12 Satisfaction with
residence
To what extent are you
satisfied with your
residence?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
13 Satisfaction with
living environment
To what extent are you
satisfied with your living
environment?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
14 Propensity to move Fraction of households that
were inclined to move and
found a residence recently
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
15 Nuisance To what extent do you have
problems with noise
pollution?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
16 Pollution To what extent do you have
problems with
environmental pollution?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
17 Heavy traffic To what extent do you have
problems with heavy
traffic?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
18 Traffic safety What is your opinion on the
traffic safety in your
neighbourhood?
WBO/WoON 2002, 2006
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